Back when I was getting my private pilot's license, I flew one of the mandatory solo cross-country legs from my home base in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to Grand Rapid, Michigan, which (at that time, at least) was a hub for package delivery jets and had a 10,000' runway. I flew in my little 2-seat Cessna 152 out to Grand Rapids, contacted approach control and got sandwiched on a long final approach between what seemed to be two 747s, but no doubt were much smaller jets. Approach control advised me to keep my speed up and "use the last half of the runway". As I recall, I crossed the runway threshold high and fast (something near cruise speed), and didn't really begin to slow to landing speed until well down the runway. I touched down about 1/2 down the runway, and still probably had a half mile left when I turned onto a taxiway. I think I could have had enough room to take off crosswise on that monster runway.

oh yeah, that's the (right) stuff

Orange County (SNA) is shorter by far, isn't it?

I can see the pilot being responsible for knowing the weight and condition of his aircraft, and the length of the runway, but I don't see how the pilot can be expected to know whether or not a runway is grooved or not, or how deep the puddles are on a runway. Is that knowledge available to the pilot?

I would think (though I have not the faintest idea) that a runway can be certified as having such and such amount of drainage in such and such amount of rainfall, and that it would be up to the airport operator to determine when a runway is safe or not for use and if not to close the runway.

Can you clarify?

Thanks.

In airport information available to all pilots you get information like this for Detroit Metro (DTW)

Runway 4R/22L

Dimensions: 12003 x 200 ft. / 3659 x 61 m

Surface: concrete/grooved, in fair condition

Weight bearing capacity: Single wheel: 100000 lbs

Double wheel: 185000 lbs

Double tandem: 350000 lbs

Runway edge lights: high intensity

RUNWAY 4R RUNWAY 22L

Latitude: 42-12.139462N 42-13.872750N

Longitude: 083-22.276098W 083-20.999433W

Elevation: 637.2 ft. 635.8 ft.

Gradient: 0.0 0.0

Traffic pattern: left left

Runway heading: 035 magnetic, 029 true 215 magnetic, 209 true

Markings: precision, in good condition precision, in good condition

RVR equipment: touchdown, midfield, rollout touchdown, midfield, rollout

Approach lights: ALSF2: standard 2,400 foot high intensity approach lighting system with centerline sequenced flashers (category II or III)

ALSO HAS SSALR. MALSR: 1,400 foot medium intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights

Runway end identifier lights: no

Centerline lights: yes yes

Touchdown point: yes, lighted yes, no lights

Instrument approach: ILS/DME ILS/DME

Obstructions: 23 ft. ant, 1071 ft. from runway, 450 ft. left of centerline, 38:1 slope to clear 26 ft. rr, 1058 ft. from runway, 632 ft. right of centerline, 33:1 slope to clear

Which tells a lot about Detroit Metro's runway 4r/22l.

It's grooved, has instrument landing capabilities and is 12003 feet long and 200 feet wide.

I can't speak for Brazil, but I'd assume that similar information exists for their airports.

The main runway in Grand Rapids (GRR) is 150 feet wide and the longest is 10,000 feet long but even that can seem short when you have problems. It's also amazing taxiing out behind a 'small' DC9 and how large it is compared to your 172.

There is an interesting error and omission in the recap of South America's worst air accidents.

The TAM flight accident that was the subject of the article (Accident #1) occurred during landing, not takeoff. It's an almost Freudian slip, considering the speculation that the pilot was attempting a go-around. If that was, in fact, the case, some technical problem within the aircraft prevented him from doing it successfully. Taking off again immediately after touching down is not rocket science, even on a wet runway. Airbus models from the A320 and up are notorious for pilots failing to grasp the software nuances of the thrust management system. The first such incident was the demonstration flight in the plane's early days that crashed into the trees during a low fly-by. The plane had dipped below 50 feet radio altitude, the thrust went to idle (assuming the pilot intended to land), the pilot couldn't spool up thrust in time and they settled into the trees at the far end of the field.

Couple this with the fact the the TAM aircraft had a deactivated thrust reverser. It has been reported (although somewhat vaguely) that this was not the first flight with the reverser turned off and the plane had experienced no problems, but I'll bet it had never attempted a go-around, or tried to stop on a super-slick runway, until the fateful landing. The primary systems on state-of-the art aircraft are electronically controlled and interrelated. An improperly deactivated thrust reverser could send erroneous information to other aircraft systems and inhibit desired responses in the thrust control or braking/anti-skid systems.

Also, the American Airlines 757 crash near CLO was a bit more complicated than a misprogrammed waypoint in the Flight Management System. The navigation error put them on the wrong side of a mountain during descent to landing in the dark of night. The GPWS (ground proximity warning system) advised the pilot of closure with terrain, and the pilot began to climb. The aircraft had the performance to clear the impending terrain, but the pilots failed to stow the spoilers that were deployed during the descent. This greatly inhibited the aircraft's ability to climb and it struck the mountain.

The real issue in this crash was Boeing's failure - with the FAA's approval - to include in the basic design of its aircraft an "auto-stow" function for the spoiler/speed brakes when the throttles are advanced. I'm really surprised Patrick failed to mention this.

Not São Paolo.

Patrick,

I understand about the wet runway, lack of grooving, inop reverse thruster and relatively heavy weight of the plane.

But, if he touched down at the right point on the runway, at between 204 and 222 km/hr, how did he manage to ONLY slow down to about 175 km/hr by the time he hit the building? You say he did not attempt to re take off. Isn't there a something missing here?

Also, if one reverse thruster is inop does that mean you cannot use the other? The news reports keep saying one reverse thruster was inop like you could use the other. So did he use the other? Could he have?

It seems to me that if you go off the end of the runway at more than 100 miles/hour, the problem is not runway length unless you think every runway has to be at least 15,000 ft in length to be safe.

Luc