Bravo for the judges on the FISA court, who want to know whether their own actions have been tainted by the Bush administration's and NSA's unwarranted and warrantless spying. In asking the perpetrators, however, they have no check on who is telling the truth. They should at least ask for information from the NYT reporters who uncovered the story and who have not released everything they know about the techniques involved in the process of information gathering because the president asked them not to divulge everything they know. The court has the right and the need to know, if they are to draw rational conclusions. The whole world is out there, speculating about methods and the length and breadth of the snooping: is it a data-mining operation like Able Danger, in other words a fishing expedition? is it a selective procedure that intercepts a few calls or e-mails once in awhile? is it a reliable program, and has it actually caught any terrorists? The court needs answers, and so do Congress and the nation. Mr. Risen and his colleagues at the Times should be called to answer as a check on what the government officials and NSA officers say. Or, I suppose, we can all wait and buy Mr. Risen's book next year.

The delegation of authority to Patrick Fitzgerald, in the Plame investigation, is "plenary." Is that broad enough to allow him to investigate the POTUS for breaching FISA?

I recall when all of the discount long distance carriers were showing up, that the way that the companies were able to offer their discount is that they were routing the calls from the point of origin to 'lines' outside of the United States, and then rerouting the calls at the destination countries back into the U.S. There was some discount in the telecommunications fee systems that they were taking advantage of.

My question to anyone investigating this scandal is whether the NSA is monitoring all 'lines' (whether terrestrial land lines, satellite, microwave, fiber optics, or any other technology that might exist) leaving the U.S., and does that include traffic for any long distance carrier where both the sender and receiver are based in the U.S., but the route that the traffic follows leaves the country.

The implication would be that ANY long distance calls made in the U.S. could have been monitored for the last four years.