The standard story seems to be that WC was out in 1981 only because Bill Paley insisted that everyone must retire at 65. The Reagan years were near the beginning of the massive buildup of corporate control. It was very convenient to have WC out of the way. Otherwise, BP would have been a fool to toss out America's most trusted man.

Each time I read one of your postings, I think "this is it." He has distilled Greenwaldianism into its purest form.

But with this one, I think you have really and truly done it!

CarolynC's post caused me to seek out a contrast. This is what I found.

"When I wanted to understand the truth about the war on drugs, I took the same approach I did to the war in Vietnam: I hit the streets and reported the story myself. I sought out the people whose lives this war has affected."--Walter Cronkite

Conkrite looked at the situation at ground level.

That's, I don't disagree with you from 30,000 feet. And that is an idealistic view of this thing. Then you have the realistic view of how this town works, and what would happen, and is it good for our reputation around the world if we're essentially putting on trial the previous administration? We would look at another country doing that, and say, geez, boy, this is...--Chuck Todd

Chuck Todd seems to think that Cronkite's 'ground level' was, in reality, looking at it from "30,000 feet". Cronkite was "idealistic".

I was a communications/theater major in college and knew little about journalism when I became an Air Force public affairs officer in 1963. I therefore had to learn journalism through OJT (On the Job Training) working for 28 years with major national and international journalists. As I worked with them, I sought out their opinion about their job and how they did it including a seminal discussion with Halberstam. Here is what I learned mostly during the ’60s and ’70s:

1.There is no such thing as an objective reporter or an objective news article/report.

2.Any reporter who thinks he is objective or neutral is misguided and dangerous.

3.Striving to be objective harms the investigation for truth and makes the reporter subject to being played by sources.

4.Finding and reporting the truth is the only job of a journalist because just providing information or regurgitating what both sides say is not journalism.

5.Being unwilling to accept full responsibility for the consequences from an investigation or published/aired story under the guise of being an objective reporter who must simply cover both sides of a story is rationalization and cowardice at its worst.

6.The fourth/fifth estate role of journalism is crucial to maintaining freedom and fairness and preventing empires or corporations from ruling the world.

I wrote on this (see sig) on CocktailHag's blog yesterday and you can read it at:

http://www.cocktailhag.com/blog/uncategorized/in-defense-of-chuck-todd-and-his-intelligence-but-not-faux-irresponsible-journalists/

The media will claim they are simply responding to demand in the marketplace. Democracy requires citizen oversight but we no longer seem able to provide it.

Conkrite and those "real jounalists" from the past that Glenn admires were so great because the government was helpless to silence them. And the Fairness Doctrine assured us all that the monied could not use the incredible power of the mass medias to sway our minds or to coerce us into believing that we were being given all sides when we were clearly not.

Mr. Obama can help restore our freedom from the influence of the wealthy and powerful in matters of mass media by a stroke of his pen. Yet he has not, and will not, re-institute the one guideline that would let Americans have a champion in the fourth estate. I mourn not only Mr. Conkrite but our freedoms.

Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, $45.00), xxxviii and 740 pages, index, and 706 pages of appendices, tables, and story and photo indices.http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/ Air University Review, November-December 1978

The Press and the TET Offensive

a flawed institution under stress

Captain Donald M. Bishop

The Tet offensive of 1968 must surely be regarded as one of history's chameleon campaigns. When the North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops assaulted targets throughout the Republic of Vietnam at the end of January 1968, they expected to trigger an uprising of the South Vietnamese people against their government. Despite some spectacular early successes, the attacks failed. The South Vietnamese did not embrace the cause; thousands of sappers, assault troops, and cadres met their deaths before overwhelming allied counterattacks; and the insurgent infrastructure was so decimated at the end of the fighting that no large enemy offensives could be mounted for four years.

Nonetheless, the Tet offensive was a turning point in the war, and the North Vietnamese were successful in altering the course of the war far beyond the accomplishments of their army. The American people were shocked that the Vietcong/ North Vietnamese Army (VC/NV A) possessed the strength to make the widespread strikes. In the public clamor that followed, President Lyndon Johnson announced a bombing halt and withdrew from the 1968 Presidential race. The policy of Vietnamization was launched, and many Americans concluded that the war was too costly to pursue.

It has always been clear that the press played a vital role in this dramatic shift of opinion. It has been evident that dissatisfaction with the war among media opinion-makers helped form an American public attitude of discouragement. Nonetheless, much of the assessment of the media's role in the war has heretofore been impressionistic and conjectural.

The publication of Big Story now replaces impressions with fact, conjectures with cold analysis.* The book presents the findings of a truly staggering study of the role of the press in this crucial military event.

*Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, $45.00), xxxviii and 740 pages, index, and 706 pages of appendices, tables, and story and photo indices.

Correspondent Peter Braestrup, who reported for the Washington Post during Tet, prepared the study and interpreted the findings. A former Marine infantry officer in Korea and an experienced war reporter (Algeria and Vietnam), Braestrup brought to the study both firsthand experience and a personal dedication to truth. He amassed detailed content and photo analysis of both print and TV reporting, a review of public opinion findings, and his own investigation. Braestrup read every word published on the Vietnam fighting by three media groupings: the Associated Press and United Press International, the New York Times and the Washington Post, and Time and Newsweek. In addition he viewed tapes of every telecast aired during the offensive by the three networks.

media misconceptions

The sheer volume of press and TV reports on Tet is intimidating, and, of course, almost every conceivable interpretation of events can be found in them. Nonetheless, Braestrup's analysis points to the emergence of several themes that came to dominate the coverage. The sober examination of these themes with hindsight reveals important misconceptions.

Misconception: There had been no warning of a coming offensive. Actually, the press ignored cautions expressed by General Earle Wheeler and General William C. Westmoreland in December and January.

Misconception: The offensive was a victory for Hanoi. The press corps, it is now clear, was stunned by the initial Tet attacks, many of which occurred in Saigon. When the allies met some initial reverses, the press reacted by emphasizing the enemy's successes. As the weeks wore on and military intelligence clearly indicated defeat for the insurgents, the press still interpreted the offensive as a "psychological victory" for the Vietcong/ North Vietnamese Army, who "held the initiative," "decide who lives and who dies... which planes land and which ones don't," who were unconcerned with losses, and could "take and hold any area they chose." There was little objective analysis of the many enemy failures or of the severe toll that allied counterblows exacted from the enemy.

Misconception: The North Vietnamese military initiative bared the unreliability and inefficiency of our own allies, the South Vietnamese. Government of Vietnam (GVN) troops were described as "lolling in the sun," failing to carry their load, and complacent. The press reported that the offensive shattered GVN control over the countryside and conclusively undermined the loyalty of the people.

A more truthful assessment: the GVN "muddled through" the crisis, Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) performance was initially inhibited by the fact that half the Vietnamese troops were on Tet leave when the enemy struck, and many ARVN units gave a good account of themselves in the subsequent fighting. Press pronouncements that the offensive eroded loyalty to the GVN were ill-informed.

Misconception: The characteristic American response was to destroy city districts and villages with overwhelming, indiscriminate firepower. This misconception was fueled by the ill-advised comment of an Air Force officer at Ben Tre that "we had to destroy the town to save it" and by television clips focusing on urban damage.

The unavailability of weapons well adapted to street fighting (the 106mm recoilless rifle, for instance) forced some difficult decisions by tactical commanders. Press reports, however, suggested that destruction was typical. Some reports from Saigon indicated the city was a giant scarred battleground; from the air, however, reporters could see that 95 percent of the city was relatively unharmed.

American and ARVN commanders did have to use heavy weaponry in urban areas, but the response was not characteristic of the counteroffensive.