Dammit!

You are correct , sir!

Thank God for the Unitary Executive!

"It's obviously possible to argue -- as Liasson obviously believes -- that withdrawal according to an unconditional timetable is the wrong policy."--G.G

This is what Foodle is basically arguing about

"But it's not possible to argue that "the American people" agree with her"--G.G.

Gist of Greenwald's argument

"Well, that's what the American people want a commander in chief to do. That might not be what his left-wing base does. The question for Obama now is what kind of Iraq does he want to leave behind."--Liasson

What refers to "facts on the ground". Want refers to the American people's desire to have the president consider those facts. Liasson then qualifies that with "what kind of Iraq" we should leave behind as a condition for withdrawal.

However, what has been demonstrated is that the majority of polls indicate the US public would prefer to withdrawal regardless of what kind of Iraq we leave behind--stable or not. IMHO, stability is the most basic of conditions that Iraq can be left in i.e. either the Iraqi govt, (the civil order), is functioning or it's not.

As evidenced by the polls, a majority of people prefer withdrawal regardless of said stability within the next year or two, while at the same time a minority prefers an immediate withdrawal, and yet another minority slightly larger than the latter prefer staying for a period of time/indefinitely in order to win/create stability. Based on these polls, the most obvious conclusion is that a plurality prefers withdrawal regardless of the conditions in Iraq.

Just my .02

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/07/fisa_surprise_us_house_bill_me.php

FISA Surprise: U.S. House Bill Means No Telecom Immunity for Months

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. House passed the "FISA Amendments Act of 2008" right before the July 4 recess, which provided a mechanism for immunizing telecommunications companies from possible lawsuits resulting from cooperation provided for the NSA wireless surveillance program after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. At the time, it was characterized as a victory for the telecoms, and the White House supported it. But they must not have read the bill until today. The House added another provision to the bill which guarantees that immunity wouldn't become effective for months after the President signs the bill, and the White House is only now demanding that the Senate remove that provision.

Under the House bill, at least four Inspectors General must review the entire program, starting from the 9-11 attacks through January of this year (corrected), and report to the Congress; the immunity becomes effective 90 days after that report is sent to Congress. The requirement has drawn a veto threat today from the Adiminstration (see this letter to the Congress).

I worked for over 10 years as a supervisory auditor in the Commerce Department Inspector General's office, and I can guarantee that such a report as contemplated, presumably to be prepared and written under generally accepted government auditing standards, cannot possibly be completed in any less than 15 months, and perhaps not for as long as two years (the provision, Section 301 in the House bill, gives the IGs a year after enactment, but they couldn't meet that deadline). We'll see how the Senate deals with this provision, now that the White House has withdrawn its support of a bill that the President's staff obviously didn't read carefully.

But strictly in terms of the ability to begin to pack up and leave, nothing is there to stop us.

With all due respect, that is the kind of magical thinking that gets us into these quagmires. Reality is another matter altogether.

I'm not arguing that we can't leave, in spite of what the nit-pickers say, but going in and getting out are two cases when you do want to pick at all the nits. It keeps you out of trouble. Col. Lang was one of the most vocal opponents of the invasion from the get-go.

What will happen in an American withdrawal of forces from Iraq?

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/Withdrawal.doc

- The first question to be asked is whether or not the withdrawal will be under hostile pressure. The two kinds of withdrawal would be radically different.

* A withdrawal conducted under non-hostile conditions would very much resemble the manner in which US forces left the Canal Zone after the return of the territory to Panamanian sovereignty or the withdrawal of coalition forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War. For this kind of withdrawal to occur a general political settlement would have to have been reached or a complete pacification of the country would have to have been achieved. Under either of those conditions, it could be assumed for planning purposes that there would be no serious indigenous interference with the departure of American forces. This kind of withdrawal would be an exercise in logistical planning in which the force would be taken out in an “administrative” (non-combat) mode. Departure would be arranged on the basis of the most efficient use of transportation as well as its availability. Most units would be returned to their permanent posts across the world without their heavy equipment, (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.) because it is more efficient to send the troops home in passenger aircraft and the equipment in separate transportation (sea usually) in the care of drivers. A withdrawal of this kind would take a long time. Large sized logistical capabilities would have to be kept in Iraq until the end of the departure to conduct the shipments. The removal of larger US Forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War took around a year and a half.

* A withdrawal under combat conditions would be very different and in the light of present political circumstances in Iraq seems more likely. During such a withdrawal there would be continuing combat operations designed to defend the force from enemies that are increasingly emboldened by American withdrawal and the prospect of “settling scores” with sectarian, political and ethnic adversaries. In that kind of departure, the force would have to be withdrawn in “slices” (tranches in French). The withdrawal from VN conducted by the Nixon Administration was of this kind. The phased departures of these “slices” would be designed to gradually “uncover” the regions of the country in a logical order as American forces move away from areas that are more easily abandoned. At the same time, the remaining forces in Iraq would have to retain a balanced combat capability that could continue to carry out force protection defensive actions as well as “spoiling” attacks against detected preparations for assaults against the ever weakening US military presence in the country. Infantry, armor, artillery and particularly aerial forces (both Army and Air Force) would be needed to protect the course of the withdrawal. The routes of withdrawal would have to be outposted and protected to keep them open while the withdrawal takes place. At the same time, the remaining force in Iraq would continue to be re-supplied over the same routes. There would likely be a lot of fighting in the course of the withdrawal. In VN, 20,000 US soldiers were killed during the several years of the withdrawal. This would be a “last chance” for the enemy forces to exact a price for the US presence in Iraq. They would be likely to take that opportunity. The logic of the present logistical situation would point to a withdrawal in phases (tranches) down the existing Main supply Route (MSR) to Kuwait where the forces could be received in prepared camps prior to departure by sea and air. The improved situation in Anbar Governorate might also make possible a smaller withdrawal to the west and into Jordan. A small percentage of the withdrawal would be conducted using air force heavy lift assets. The units withdrawn by air are likely to be air force.

- A “residual” military presence in Iraq is another major issue.

In a withdrawal conducted under administrative conditions, it will be possible to position a “force” of trainers, suppliers, SOF jihadi hunters and force protection people wherever they are needed. The force protection element of this force might be a reinforced heavy brigade. Altogether the benign atmosphere presence might be 20,000.

In a “contested” withdrawal, the existence of these forces will be problematic from the beginning. A “residual” force with less than a reinforced heavy division and appropriate air support as the basis of its security would be a very risky venture over the long run. This force would number something in the area of 35,000 to 40,000 people. The logistical problems involved in supplying this force or any sized force overland would be enormous.