it long ago became obvious that repairing the infrastructure and public works is approximately 100% dependent on the civil strife coming to a halt first.

I should add that for at least some of us, including myself, "long ago" means prior to March of 2003.

I'm not saying this to boast of my powers of precognition. The question is how it could possibly be that it wasn't apparent to George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, or to any of the other top-ranking officials and advisers who ultimately planned the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Look, the readers here are not fools. I -- and I would bet most -- understand that a withdrawal from Iraq must be phased over months so that with each incremental reduction, combat troops are left with sufficient medical, food, and various non-combat supports in place. And it must be done so that as we leave, those combat troops temporarily still in place are not further endangered.

But having said all that, the withdrawal -- and every sane person knows it cannot happen in one week -- should have commenced when the Democrats took Congress in '06.

That's why I qualified my comment with the modifier "begin to withdraw."

I said that nothing is stopping us from leaving; I didn't say there wouldn't be anything slowing us down.

I've tried to steer clear from arguing over whether withdrawal according to an unconditional timetable is the right or wrong policy. In the past several posts I have been trying to address what is clear and what is ambiguous from the polling data on Americans policy preferences for Iraq.

But strictly in terms of the ability to begin to pack up and leave, nothing is there to stop us.

With all due respect, that is the kind of magical thinking that gets us into these quagmires. Reality is another matter altogether.

I'm not arguing that we can't leave, in spite of what the nit-pickers say, but going in and getting out are two cases when you do want to pick at all the nits. It keeps you out of trouble. Col. Lang was one of the most vocal opponents of the invasion from the get-go.

What will happen in an American withdrawal of forces from Iraq?

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/Withdrawal.doc

- The first question to be asked is whether or not the withdrawal will be under hostile pressure. The two kinds of withdrawal would be radically different.

* A withdrawal conducted under non-hostile conditions would very much resemble the manner in which US forces left the Canal Zone after the return of the territory to Panamanian sovereignty or the withdrawal of coalition forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War. For this kind of withdrawal to occur a general political settlement would have to have been reached or a complete pacification of the country would have to have been achieved. Under either of those conditions, it could be assumed for planning purposes that there would be no serious indigenous interference with the departure of American forces. This kind of withdrawal would be an exercise in logistical planning in which the force would be taken out in an “administrative” (non-combat) mode. Departure would be arranged on the basis of the most efficient use of transportation as well as its availability. Most units would be returned to their permanent posts across the world without their heavy equipment, (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.) because it is more efficient to send the troops home in passenger aircraft and the equipment in separate transportation (sea usually) in the care of drivers. A withdrawal of this kind would take a long time. Large sized logistical capabilities would have to be kept in Iraq until the end of the departure to conduct the shipments. The removal of larger US Forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War took around a year and a half.

* A withdrawal under combat conditions would be very different and in the light of present political circumstances in Iraq seems more likely. During such a withdrawal there would be continuing combat operations designed to defend the force from enemies that are increasingly emboldened by American withdrawal and the prospect of “settling scores” with sectarian, political and ethnic adversaries. In that kind of departure, the force would have to be withdrawn in “slices” (tranches in French). The withdrawal from VN conducted by the Nixon Administration was of this kind. The phased departures of these “slices” would be designed to gradually “uncover” the regions of the country in a logical order as American forces move away from areas that are more easily abandoned. At the same time, the remaining forces in Iraq would have to retain a balanced combat capability that could continue to carry out force protection defensive actions as well as “spoiling” attacks against detected preparations for assaults against the ever weakening US military presence in the country. Infantry, armor, artillery and particularly aerial forces (both Army and Air Force) would be needed to protect the course of the withdrawal. The routes of withdrawal would have to be outposted and protected to keep them open while the withdrawal takes place. At the same time, the remaining force in Iraq would continue to be re-supplied over the same routes. There would likely be a lot of fighting in the course of the withdrawal. In VN, 20,000 US soldiers were killed during the several years of the withdrawal. This would be a “last chance” for the enemy forces to exact a price for the US presence in Iraq. They would be likely to take that opportunity. The logic of the present logistical situation would point to a withdrawal in phases (tranches) down the existing Main supply Route (MSR) to Kuwait where the forces could be received in prepared camps prior to departure by sea and air. The improved situation in Anbar Governorate might also make possible a smaller withdrawal to the west and into Jordan. A small percentage of the withdrawal would be conducted using air force heavy lift assets. The units withdrawn by air are likely to be air force.

- A “residual” military presence in Iraq is another major issue.

In a withdrawal conducted under administrative conditions, it will be possible to position a “force” of trainers, suppliers, SOF jihadi hunters and force protection people wherever they are needed. The force protection element of this force might be a reinforced heavy brigade. Altogether the benign atmosphere presence might be 20,000.

In a “contested” withdrawal, the existence of these forces will be problematic from the beginning. A “residual” force with less than a reinforced heavy division and appropriate air support as the basis of its security would be a very risky venture over the long run. This force would number something in the area of 35,000 to 40,000 people. The logistical problems involved in supplying this force or any sized force overland would be enormous.