Of the more than 58,000 combat dead from the Vietnam War, well over 40 percent, close to half, were recorded under the Nixon administration.

Nixon also promulgated the POW-MIA flag campaign.

To this day, the black flag flies over public buildings in this country. The effort was designed in part to rally many Americans who could not then and cannot now accept the notion of a "defeat" on the battlefield, or even, a stalemate.

Clearly, over many years, the "stab in the back" myth was used to exploit many family members of American POWs and MIAs.

My pedantic post is not in defense of Richard Nixon, but Vietnam War casualties did not increase due to the delayed efforts by Richard Nixon to end the Vietnam War after he became President. Vietnam War casualties remained very high, but gradually decreased starting from the time Richard Nixon became President. Although Richard Nixon maintained that he had a secret plan to end the war when he campaigned for President during 1968, this secret plan actually was to win the war, and he did not take a more pragmatic approach to end the war until the latter part of his first term. This is the reason that war casualties remained high even as these casualties were decreasing during Nixon's first three years as President. When President Nixon finally realized that the Vietnam War could not be won without taking very risky and politically unpopular measures, he tried to devise a way of winning "peace with honor", but even that proved to be elusive. Henry Kissinger's final Vietnam strategy was the so-called "decent interval" between withdrawal of military forces and the inevitable result (including widespread public realization that our military involvement in Vietnam was a failure).

Although the number of U.S. military deaths in Vietnam reached 52,000 during 1970 (not at the end of 1968), in the exchange that is cited between Senator McCain and Henry (The Angel of Death) Kissinger, Senator McCain was using an incorrect figure to refer to the number of U.S. military deaths in the eight-year period beginning in 1965 (when U.S. military involvement in Vietnam significantly escalated). It is also clear that this death toll was acceptable to Senator McCain and Heny Kissinger, despite the failure of their mission in Vietnam. The "stab in the back" theory may be used by some Vietnam veterans as a rationale for the futility of their sacrifice, but it has been exploited more frequently by dishonest politicians from Ronald Reagan to John McCain as a means of obfuscating any lessons that should have been learned from ill-advised military ventures.

Regardless of who did what or signed what in 1954, by the time the U.S. became fully involved in Vietnam in 1965, both North and South Vietnam were de facto (if not de jure) two different countries with separate governments, separate militaries, and separate recognition in the U.N.

The 1954 Geneva Accords required that a national election would be held in 1956 to reunite Vietnam under one government. However, the government of South Vietnam, now under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem, refused the proposed election and instead prepared for war. Some contemporary observers consider that if an election had been held in the 1954-55 period, around 80% of the Vietnamese population would have voted for Ho Chi Minh.[17] Even "President Eisenhower is widely quoted to the effect that in 1954 as many as 80% of the Vietnamese people would have voted for Ho Chi Minh, as the popular hero of their liberation, in an election against Bao Dai... "[18] However, the United States remained fearful of the prospect of losing its influence in Indochina, which would be valuable as a military base in a future conflict with Communist China.

Inflictus no more.

I just got around to reading William Astore's article that Glenn linked to in his original post. For convenience, I'm linking to it again in my sig. Well worth the read.

A couple comments:

1. Astore makes a valuable mention of Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" of the executive, the military, and the people, on the way to restating the principle that it's up to the executive to gain the support of the people for the war.

This is important not because it comes from a wise dead Prussian officer and military strategist, but because it's the actual doctrine the organs of the US defense establishment have been required to follow, and on which the senior leadership of the uniformed military have been trained, since the end of Vietnam.

When we argue with people like McCain or those who support him, we're better armed if we understand what the doctrine is and how it was trampled by the administration.

2. The only blemish in the article: Astore cites the quote used in Col. Harry Summers' frontspiece (about how Summers told his NVA counterpart, 'You know you never defeated us on the field of battle (sic)', and his counterpart replied, 'That is true, but it is also irrelevant.'), but mischaracterizes it.

According to Astore, Summers cites the incident 'approvingly', and that the resultant myth about the 'unbeatable' military now gives current officers comfort and feeds their stab-in-the-back tendencies.

But this is an absolutely false rendering of Summers' argument, and the exact opposite of the book's entire purpose. The anecdote introduces an explanation of why the claim of unbroken tactical victory was irrelevant, i.e. why strategy matters. Summers uses the 1st half of the book to explain (using Clausewitz) the 'trinity', political will, the role of the military, and the framing of the objective ... which it is up to the executive to do, because the purpose of the war is always political (not military) and the end of the war will always be a political settlement. In the second half, Summers applies some of Clausewitz's principles (mass, economy of force, unity of command, etc) to explain how the specifically military aspect of 'strategy' should proceed, using counter-examples and lessons-learned from VN.

Astore's piece is otherwise worthwhile. I'm calling out the error only because Summers' book is an especially valuable read that shouldn't be impeached or stained by association with stab-in-the-back. The 1st half is especially important. Assigned by the army to write the definitive 'lessons learned' document, Summers was clear in articulating that the failure was the responsibility of the military, not media, not protestors, etc.

When I was giving talks in late 2001 and 2002 to get people to ask questions about the GWOT, I bought a bunch of copies and handed them out for that reason. (He also wrote an instant-book right after Desert Storm, updating the thesis; it feels a little rushed, and it has flaws, but it's good reinforcement).

I've recommended it in here before, and I'll repeat that recommendation now.