Letters to the Editor
-
@arne
Ummm, there was one nation: Vietnam.
Umm, no there wasn't. Try researching the Geneva Accords of 1954. (And you're the one calling everyone else "historical eedjits"!!)
OIC. We only intended to subjugate the southernhalf of the country. I feel much better.
I have no idea what "OIC" means. But please provide a single scintilla of evidence that the U.S.'s intent was to "subjugate" South Vietnam (an independent nation despite your historical ignorance).
You miss the point. McCain seems to be friendly to the notion that hitting the few hard targets in an agrarian country (and defoliating, napalming, and carpet-bombing ox-cart paths) was not enough; we should have been harder on them....
No, you miss the point of my original post. We attacked military targets in North Vietnam, not to subjugate the North Vietnamese people (part of the WaPos' mistaken blog that Glenn keyed on) but to hit military targets. That's why we mined Haiphong harbor; to prevent Soviet military supplies from being trans-shipped there. That's why we bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Again, who's the eedjit who can't read?
The rest of your post is more of the usual nonsense I expect from you. You're not nearly as smart as you think you are. And you can dispense with the "cheers" nonsense. I don't like to drink with self-inflated idiots.
-
Dignify this, media
I would be willing to let go of media indictment regarding coverage blackouts or pandering to the military if they would dignify some of what Greenwald writes here. Are the media's general compliance/support of this war a half-hearted reflection of regurgitating what the "American public" tell them? Or, are they making up for flubbing it back in the 'Nam conflict?
I don't buy it. The emails now made public are too incriminating. I suppose it reiterates the importance of staying critical. Don't believe what you hear or read from the onset. Entertain skepticism and suspend believability if an "expert" tells you the "truth." Google people. Look up their credentials. Keep asking questions. The dialogue that ensues is more based in truth than what some talking head would like for you to believe.
-
@ Sol Invictus
[Arne]: Ummm, there was one nation: Vietnam.
Umm, no there wasn't. Try researching the Geneva Accords of 1954. (And you're the one calling everyone else "historical eedjits"!!)
Yes, there was. The north-south demarcation was intended to implement a cease-fire, pending nationwide elections under international auspices in 1956. There was no division of Vietnam into two countries.
FWIW, the United States refused to recognise the 1954 Geneva accords.
<[Arne]: OIC. We only intended to subjugate the southern half of the country. I feel much better.
I have no idea what "OIC" means. But please provide a single scintilla of evidence that the U.S.'s intent was to "subjugate" South Vietnam (an independent nation despite your historical ignorance).
Acronymfinder.com is your friend. Or you could do what grade-schoolers are told to do and sound it out.
As for the "intent", read Kinzer's book. But it was you that said we didn't intend to "subjugate" the northern half. That would leave only the southern one....
[Arne]: You miss the point. McCain seems to be friendly to the notion that hitting the few hard targets in an agrarian country (and defoliating, napalming, and carpet-bombing ox-cart paths) was not enough; we should have been harder on them....
No, you miss the point of my original post. We attacked military targets in North Vietnam, not to subjugate the North Vietnamese people (part of the WaPos' mistaken blog that Glenn keyed on) but to hit military targets. That's why we mined Haiphong harbor; to prevent Soviet military supplies from being trans-shipped there. That's why we bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Again, who's the eedjit who can't read?
Damn. If they'd just labeled the Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as we labeled Route 66, it would have been so much easier. Can we sue them for false (or missing) labeling?
So we attacked "military targets". Except, as I pointed out, those were few and far between, and we kind of ran out.... Which makes any escalation (as McCain suggests would have been the right course) rather problematic.
The rest of your post is more of the usual nonsense I expect from you. You're not nearly as smart as you think you are. And you can dispense with the "cheers" nonsense. I don't like to drink with self-inflated idiots.
And a hearty 4Q2! Would you prefer that toast to "cheers"?
As for being "smart", I don't worry about that. I worry about being right. Which might seem arrogant at times to those that aren't, but that's your problem, not mine.
Cheers,
-
@ had_enough: It's a long way to November
"Cheney really is crazy, isn't he?"
-- had_enough
Yup.
That's what all the Iran nonsense is about. Start another illegal, immoral war of choice between now and November and you have the scenario for another 2004, with McSame as a proxy president. Fear motivated voters then...those who didn't 'want to change horses in midstream'.
Sheesh, what an evil and corrupt Rasputin can do when they set their minds to it! "So?"
-
McCain's confused. The American people never thought of "losing" nor denying America's military might
It was the reasons for being there...for being engaged. That is why we did not want the fighting to continue. We simply didn't believe in it...nor after hearing all the propaganda would we believe in it even if we conquered Viet Nam. It was a war of lies that once discovered removed our "will" to be there at all.
-
Astore's piece in TomDispatch
I just got around to reading William Astore's article that Glenn linked to in his original post. For convenience, I'm linking to it again in my sig. Well worth the read.
A couple comments:
1. Astore makes a valuable mention of Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" of the executive, the military, and the people, on the way to restating the principle that it's up to the executive to gain the support of the people for the war.
This is important not because it comes from a wise dead Prussian officer and military strategist, but because it's the actual doctrine the organs of the US defense establishment have been required to follow, and on which the senior leadership of the uniformed military have been trained, since the end of Vietnam.
When we argue with people like McCain or those who support him, we're better armed if we understand what the doctrine is and how it was trampled by the administration.
2. The only blemish in the article: Astore cites the quote used in Col. Harry Summers' frontspiece (about how Summers told his NVA counterpart, 'You know you never defeated us on the field of battle (sic)', and his counterpart replied, 'That is true, but it is also irrelevant.'), but mischaracterizes it.
According to Astore, Summers cites the incident 'approvingly', and that the resultant myth about the 'unbeatable' military now gives current officers comfort and feeds their stab-in-the-back tendencies.
But this is an absolutely false rendering of Summers' argument, and the exact opposite of the book's entire purpose. The anecdote introduces an explanation of why the claim of unbroken tactical victory was irrelevant, i.e. why strategy matters. Summers uses the 1st half of the book to explain (using Clausewitz) the 'trinity', political will, the role of the military, and the framing of the objective ... which it is up to the executive to do, because the purpose of the war is always political (not military) and the end of the war will always be a political settlement. In the second half, Summers applies some of Clausewitz's principles (mass, economy of force, unity of command, etc) to explain how the specifically military aspect of 'strategy' should proceed, using counter-examples and lessons-learned from VN.
Astore's piece is otherwise worthwhile. I'm calling out the error only because Summers' book is an especially valuable read that shouldn't be impeached or stained by association with stab-in-the-back. The 1st half is especially important. Assigned by the army to write the definitive 'lessons learned' document, Summers was clear in articulating that the failure was the responsibility of the military, not media, not protestors, etc.
When I was giving talks in late 2001 and 2002 to get people to ask questions about the GWOT, I bought a bunch of copies and handed them out for that reason. (He also wrote an instant-book right after Desert Storm, updating the thesis; it feels a little rushed, and it has flaws, but it's good reinforcement).
I've recommended it in here before, and I'll repeat that recommendation now.