The Allies evacuated 338,000 men from Dunkirk between May 27 and June 4, 1940 under conditions almost infinitely worse than we face in Iraq today.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dunkirk

Leaving Iraq can be done in weeks, it wouldn't be pretty but it would be doable. Frankly, a lot of the equipment we would be abandoning is worn out anyway, there are square miles of military equipment in dire need of refurbishing already in Army depots in the US..

It's not a quagmire because we *can't* leave, it's a quagmire because we *won't* leave.

You are spot on. We can leave. We should leave. We can do it in a very few weeks.

Those who say otherwise want to stay; want to see innocents killed.

Last nite I rented Hotel Rwanda, and assuming it is basically accurate, a genocide of 1 million Africans occurred even as the country waited urgently for the West to send in UN troops. When an atrocity is brought starkly home to one, as that film does, it is hard to say those with the capacity to do something about it should refrain. But then what? Stay and occupy for decades? And where to draw the line, given that large-scale atrocities are a regular feature of human societies?

I do not know the answer. But I do know that Iraq is a violent nightmare now, and we are the cause. That little boy's body should be all over CNN, MSNBC and *cough* Fox.

-- -Mona-

I am afraid you missed an important point. It took a colonial power to cause the situation; it was intervention that set it up. "The Belgians sought an explanation for the complex monarchy they found in the colony, and the simple distinction of Hutu and Tutsi, on the basis of race, rather than class, was theirs. The Belgians brought in identification cards to every Rwandan, with preferential treatment to Tutsis for positions in education, politics and business." The distinction was mainly economic before the Belgians, and then became faux-racial.

There are often times that we should leave others alone to sort out their own affairs and stop making it worse. Perhaps it is all the time. If only we would stop killing around the world and show others that peace can bring prosperity.

Then again, peace does not sell in American political campaigns.

The argument goes: we need more colonialism to solve the problems of colonialism. When you speak to most American college students, they think that colonialism refers to a furniture style, or to the American period that precedes the revolution. If you speak to many others that think they know about colonialism, whatever existed before the "enlightenment" of England or France or even the modern state of Israel were savage, warring, disorganized tribes killing each other. In many ways, the horrors of WWII overshadowed the horrors of colonialism throughout what we call the third world. What is the state of Somalia? What is the state of Iraq? All of these countries knew Western occupation in the past. And they know the fact of neo-colonialism now (the exploitation of their labor and resources for the comfort -- the way of life -- of the West). Somehow, awareness of exploitation has become some sort of touchy feely liberal thing. But if current politics tell us anything, they should tell us that you can't completely kill off opposition or the people who disagree with you or the people that you dislike. The killing takes a toll -- not just on the devastated populations, but on the killers. Horrors are not forgotten, they live on in memory and even in political structures and in failed regimes. The real problem is that if we pull out of Iraq, someone will come in and disinterestedly solve the problem with money and resources - probably China or India, who could use the oil.

Is that facts and reality have become lost amid all the propaganda and the ability to distinguish between the real and the unreal, the ability to trust, if you will, in what you are being told by those who know what they are talking about and who have no agenda. Be thankful it isn't Dunkirk.

What will happen in an American withdrawal of forces from Iraq?

- The first question to be asked is whether or not the withdrawal will be under hostile pressure. The two kinds of withdrawal would be radically different.

* A withdrawal conducted under non-hostile conditions would very much resemble the manner in which US forces left the Canal Zone after the return of the territory to Panamanian sovereignty or the withdrawal of coalition forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War. For this kind of withdrawal to occur a general political settlement would have to have been reached or a complete pacification of the country would have to have been achieved. Under either of those conditions, it could be assumed for planning purposes that there would be no serious indigenous interference with the departure of American forces. This kind of withdrawal would be an exercise in logistical planning in which the force would be taken out in an “administrative” (non-combat) mode. Departure would be arranged on the basis of the most efficient use of transportation as well as its availability. Most units would be returned to their permanent posts across the world without their heavy equipment, (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.) because it is more efficient to send the troops home in passenger aircraft and the equipment in separate transportation (sea usually) in the care of drivers. A withdrawal of this kind would take a long time. Large sized logistical capabilities would have to be kept in Iraq until the end of the departure to conduct the shipments. The removal of larger US Forces from Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War took around a year and a half.

* A withdrawal under combat conditions would be very different and in the light of present political circumstances in Iraq seems more likely. During such a withdrawal there would be continuing combat operations designed to defend the force from enemies that are increasingly emboldened by American withdrawal and the prospect of “settling scores” with sectarian, political and ethnic adversaries. In that kind of departure, the force would have to be withdrawn in “slices” (tranches in French). The withdrawal from VN conducted by the Nixon Administration was of this kind. The phased departures of these “slices” would be designed to gradually “uncover” the regions of the country in a logical order as American forces move away from areas that are more easily abandoned. At the same time, the remaining forces in Iraq would have to retain a balanced combat capability that could continue to carry out force protection defensive actions as well as “spoiling” attacks against detected preparations for assaults against the ever weakening US military presence in the country. Infantry, armor, artillery and particularly aerial forces (both Army and Air Force) would be needed to protect the course of the withdrawal. The routes of withdrawal would have to be outposted and protected to keep them open while the withdrawal takes place. At the same time, the remaining force in Iraq would continue to be re-supplied over the same routes. There would likely be a lot of fighting in the course of the withdrawal. In VN, 20,000 US soldiers were killed during the several years of the withdrawal. This would be a “last chance” for the enemy forces to exact a price for the US presence in Iraq. They would be likely to take that opportunity. The logic of the present logistical situation would point to a withdrawal in phases (tranches) down the existing Main supply Route (MSR) to Kuwait where the forces could be received in prepared camps prior to departure by sea and air. The improved situation in Anbar Governorate might also make possible a smaller withdrawal to the west and into Jordan. A small percentage of the withdrawal would be conducted using air force heavy lift assets. The units withdrawn by air are likely to be air force.

- A “residual” military presence in Iraq is another major issue.

In a withdrawal conducted under administrative conditions, it will be possible to position a “force” of trainers, suppliers, SOF jihadi hunters and force protection people wherever they are needed. The force protection element of this force might be a reinforced heavy brigade. Altogether the benign atmosphere presence might be 20,000.

In a “contested” withdrawal, the existence of these forces will be problematic from the beginning. A “residual” force with less than a reinforced heavy division and appropriate air support as the basis of its security would be a very risky venture over the long run. This force would number something in the area of 35,000 to 40,000 people. The logistical problems involved in supplying this force or any sized force overland would be enormous.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/Withdrawal.doc.