I can speculate from a 'school solution';

1. NYT got their FOIA request through, eventually, so the docs were out there. OSD does not necessarily think what they did was wrong.

2. Put the docs up on your web site. That way you can say, 'We've got nothing to hide and we're hiding nothing'.

3. Throw a lot of flak into the universe, to increase the noise-signal ratio.

The flak will be generated by legions of sympathetic RW bloggers, radio commentators, etc, who will dutifully comb through the docs as we have ... except with tendentious intent, cherry-picking proof of 'innocence' (or proof that it Just Doesn't Matter).

See also, David Kay WMD search data dump.

So why not post the docs?

In fact, I am so thoroughly misled by this ploy that I have no opinion about it at all.

Barr's candidacy "could' also draw down a plague of locusts, as far as I know or care.

I try to prioritize. When it gets closer to November, I'll start looking at who might siphon votes from who, if it seems relevant. In the meantime, there are bigger fish to fry (as they say down here in Georgia).

1. They don't think what they're doing is wrong.

2. They think they're operating in hostile territory, struggling to set things right amidst a traitorous sea of nattering nabobs whose only goal is their failure and the destruction of America. Only They can save us all.

3. They are used to be fellated by journalists, and don't like it when the lip smacking ends. See the exchange between Galloway and Di Rita at my sig (one of the ones I posted to LWM a while ago).

4. They think Glenn is a pipsqueak, just like all bloggers who aren't in compliance with 3 above. They have to toady to people who can make trouble for them, they aren't going to bother to hide their contempt in Glenn's case. Which is great, because it causes them to throw caution to the winds and make ever more revealing statements.

5. The focus on minute details is a classical rhetorical strategy ... it simultaneously suggests your mastery of them, and shifts the debate to factual matters of different granularity (where you have just claimed an advantage). Just like the so-called 'criticism' of the war allegedly proferred by some of the MAs, and just like our co-called 'debate' in 2002 was framed by the episodic leaking of battle plan drafts (but boy, were there some great graphics).

I just got around to reading William Astore's article that Glenn linked to in his original post. For convenience, I'm linking to it again in my sig. Well worth the read.

A couple comments:

1. Astore makes a valuable mention of Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" of the executive, the military, and the people, on the way to restating the principle that it's up to the executive to gain the support of the people for the war.

This is important not because it comes from a wise dead Prussian officer and military strategist, but because it's the actual doctrine the organs of the US defense establishment have been required to follow, and on which the senior leadership of the uniformed military have been trained, since the end of Vietnam.

When we argue with people like McCain or those who support him, we're better armed if we understand what the doctrine is and how it was trampled by the administration.

2. The only blemish in the article: Astore cites the quote used in Col. Harry Summers' frontspiece (about how Summers told his NVA counterpart, 'You know you never defeated us on the field of battle (sic)', and his counterpart replied, 'That is true, but it is also irrelevant.'), but mischaracterizes it.

According to Astore, Summers cites the incident 'approvingly', and that the resultant myth about the 'unbeatable' military now gives current officers comfort and feeds their stab-in-the-back tendencies.

But this is an absolutely false rendering of Summers' argument, and the exact opposite of the book's entire purpose. The anecdote introduces an explanation of why the claim of unbroken tactical victory was irrelevant, i.e. why strategy matters. Summers uses the 1st half of the book to explain (using Clausewitz) the 'trinity', political will, the role of the military, and the framing of the objective ... which it is up to the executive to do, because the purpose of the war is always political (not military) and the end of the war will always be a political settlement. In the second half, Summers applies some of Clausewitz's principles (mass, economy of force, unity of command, etc) to explain how the specifically military aspect of 'strategy' should proceed, using counter-examples and lessons-learned from VN.

Astore's piece is otherwise worthwhile. I'm calling out the error only because Summers' book is an especially valuable read that shouldn't be impeached or stained by association with stab-in-the-back. The 1st half is especially important. Assigned by the army to write the definitive 'lessons learned' document, Summers was clear in articulating that the failure was the responsibility of the military, not media, not protestors, etc.

When I was giving talks in late 2001 and 2002 to get people to ask questions about the GWOT, I bought a bunch of copies and handed them out for that reason. (He also wrote an instant-book right after Desert Storm, updating the thesis; it feels a little rushed, and it has flaws, but it's good reinforcement).

I've recommended it in here before, and I'll repeat that recommendation now.

Listen, you don't understand.

Not one of these outlets has shown a picture of this racy dress with the young woman in it.

I'm the victim here.

Triple-negative not unsmart, you mean.