March 14, 2003- “Mr. Yoo’s opinion, had been requested by Mr. Haynes at the initiation of the [OLC] Working Group process, and repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had said six months earlier. [August 1, 2002] […] [It stated that] criminal laws, such as the federal torture statute, would not apply to certain military interrogations, and that interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interrogation methods that would otherwise violate the law.” (DD)

Spring 2003-Rumsfeld signs the working-group report based on John Yoo’s opinion, without the knowledge of Mora or any other internal legal critics. Rumsfeld’s signature gave it the weight of a military order. (O)

April 16, 2003- the Pentagon issues a memorandum to the U.S. Southern Command, approving twenty-four interrogation methods for use at Guantánamo, including isolation and what it called “fear up harsh”. (O)

April 16, 2003- “less than two weeks after the [OLC] Working Group completed its report, the Secretary [Rumsfeld] authorized the use of 24 specific interrogation techniques for use at GTMO.” [See also March 14, 2003] ““If, in your view, you require additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee.”-Rumsfeld [See August 13, 2003- Mohamedou Ould Slahi.] (DD)

Summer 2003-“around the same time that a message was being conveyed that interrogators should be more aggressive with detainees.” […] “Captain Wood, who by that time was the Interrogation Officer in Charge at Abu Ghraib, obtained a copy of the Special Mission Unit interrogation policy and submitted it, virtually unchanged, to her chain of command as proposed policy.” (DD)

June 2003- press accounts asserted that the U.S. was subjecting detainees to “stress and duress” techniques, including beatings and food deprivation. Senator Patrick Leahy, (D-Vt) wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, asking for a clear statement of the Administration’s detainee policy. Haynes wrote a letter back to Leahy, which was subsequently released to the press, saying that the Pentagon’s policy was never to engage in torture, or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. (O)

June 2, 2003-General George Casey, Jr., then the director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, in a secret memo, “issued a warning to General Michael DeLong, at the Central Command: “CIA has advised that the techniques the military forces are using to interrogate high value detainees (HVDs) . . . are more aggressive than the techniques used by CIA who is [sic] interviewing the same HVDs.” DeLong replied to Casey that the techniques in use were “doctrinally appropriate techniques,” in accordance with Army regulations and Rumsfeld’s direction.” (Q)

July 7, 2004- Mora wrote a 22 page memo to Vice Admiral Albert Church, who led a Pentagon investigation into abuses at the U.S. detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, showing that “in 2003 Mora tried to halt what he saw as a disastrous and unlawful policy of authorizing cruelty toward terror suspects.” (O)

Mid August, 2004-“an email from staff at Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) headquarters in Iraq requested that subordinate units provide input for a “wish list” of interrogation techniques, stated that “the gloves are coming off,” and said “we want these detainees broken.”” (DD)

August 13, 2002- “Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Slahi plan” [See also April 16, 2003] (DD)

Late August 2003-Pentagon orders “Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander at Guantánamo, to Iraq.”(Q) “Major General Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, led a team to Iraq to assess interrogation and detention operations.” […] Major General Miller said the ISG was “running a country club” for detainees. […] “we had to get tougher with the detainees.”” (DD)

September 2003-“The DoD IG reported that in September 2003, at the request of the Commander of the Special Mission Unit Task Force, JPRA [SERE?] deployed a team to Iraq to assist interrogation operations. During that trip, which was explicitly approved by U.S. Joint Forces Command, JPRA’s higher headquarters, SERE instructors were authorized to participate in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody using SERE techniques.” [See September 2008 for details from a witness] (DD)

September 14, 2003-“Commander of CJTF-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, issued the first CJTF-7 interrogation SOP. […]with the knowledge that there were ongoing discussions about the legality of some of the approved techniques. […] “issued a new policy on October 12, 2003.” (DD)

December 2003- (in an extraordinary repudiation of the Administration’s own legal work) the Office of Legal Counsel quietly withdraws the Yoo opinion. (O) “Jack Goldsmith, the new Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel […]both the so-called first Bybee memo and Mr. Yoo’s memo. In late December 2003, Mr. Goldsmith notified Mr. Haynes that DoD could no longer rely on Mr. Yoo’s memo in determining the lawfulness of interrogation techniques. The change in OLC guidance, however, did not keep JPRA from making plans to continue their support to interrogation operations. In fact, it is not clear that the agency was even aware of the change.” (DD)

January 2004-The Abu Gharaib inquiry by General Taguba begins. Taguba filed his report in March.” (Q)

January 13, 2004-“a military policeman named Joseph Darby gave the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (C.I.D.) a CD full of images of abuse. Two days later, General Craddock and Vice-Admiral Timothy Keating, the director of the Joint Staff of the J.C.S., were e-mailed a summary of the abuses depicted on the CD. (Q)

February 2004-Taguba’s team “spent much of February, 2004, in Iraq. Taguba was overwhelmed by the scale of the wrongdoing.” (Q)