showing that “Heck, we armed Iran throughout the 1980s.” […secretly …and with Israel’s help.]

1983-“Strategic Cooperation” agreed on between Reagan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel. “[…] involves joint military exercises, enhanced sharing of intelligence information and periodic meetings of a joint military committee.” [1]

June 1984- THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE, a private research institute based in Jerusalem and concentrating, among other things, on terrorism, sponsored a conference in Washington…(NYT: “Rolling Back the Barbarians”, a book review of “TERRORISM How the West Can Win” edited by Benjamin Netanyahu, which is a compilation of writings regarding this meeting) One of their ideas is that: “behind these terrorist states is the Soviet Union - training and manipulating the terrorists and sustaining the terrorist states.”

Late 1984- [The Senate Intelligence Committee Report about Iran-Contra] says the initial discussions were held in Israel in late 1984 - earlier than first believed - by Mr. Ghorbanifar; Jacob Nimrodi, an arms dealer who was a former Israeli defense attache in Iran; Al Schwimmer, a founder of Israel's aircraft industry who was close to Shimon Peres, then Prime Minister, and Mr. Kimche. [3]

“The consultant, Michael Ledeen, had been dispatched by Robert C. McFarlane, a senior adviser to President Reagan who believed it was possible to explore a closer relationship with Iran.” [4] “In January [1986], President Reagan signed an executive order that called for secret contacts with Iran and waived regulations blocking arms shipments to Iran. The previous delivery, in September, had been sent without a waiver, Administration officials said.” “Administration officials said the program had its inception when Mr. McFarlane sent Mr. Ledeen, a former adviser to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, to Israel in mid-1985 [The beginning date was later found to have been earlier. (The Senate Intelligence Committee Report)] [2] to meet with Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Mr. Ledeen asked Mr. Peres for Israel's assessment of whether the United States could or should pursue better relations with Iran. Mr. Peres encouraged the idea.” “Israeli officials suggested Mr. Ghorbanifar as a possible contact and Mr. Ledeen then met with him and David Kimche, who was at the time director general of Israel's foreign service. […] Subsequently, according to an Israeli source, an arrangement began in which Israel shipped parts to Iran and received replacements from the United States.”

May 1985- “…the chairman of the C.I.A.'s National Intelligence Council, Graham Fuller, wrote a report with a provocative idea: an opening to Iran as a means of blocking any Soviet move in region.” (J)

May and June 1985- a consultant to the National Security Council, Michael Ledeen, went to Israel and met with Prime Minister Peres. The Israeli press has said Mr. Ledeen raised the issue of hostages and arms; American officials say this is untrue and that the visit was intended to seek Israel's advice on whether it would be wise to seek closer ties with Iran. (J)

July 1985- “According to an exchange of cables between Mr. McFarlane, who was in Washington, and Mr. Shultz, who was in the Far East at the time, Mr. McFarlane endorsed the Israeli plan as promising, even though it included the possibility of selling arms to Iran. Mr. Shultz replied that although he agreed that the United States should not turn its back on the prospect of gaining the release of the seven hostages then in Lebanon, and perhaps renewing ties with a more compatible regime in Iran, he cautioned Mr. McFarlane about the risks. He said the United States should be essentially passive and await further signs from the Iranians. He also expressed concern that Israel might be seeking to supply arms to Iran for its own reasons, which were not those of the United States, and that there was ''a peril in undertaking such an initiative with Israel.'' [2]

August 1985- August, September and November 1985, the Israelis sent American-made missiles to Iran from their own stockpiles, with the understanding that the United States would replenish their arsenal. The C.I.A. began shipping weapons to Iran from American stocks in February 1986. [3]

December 6, 1985 – “On Dec. 6, two days after Mr. McFarlane left his post, senior officials met to evaluate the Iran initiative. The conclusion was that diplomatic contacts were to be encouraged but the arms shipments were to be cut off. Mr. McFarlane told Mr. Ghorbanifar and Mr. Kimche of this decision in London on Dec. 8.” (J)

Jan. 17, 1986-“President Reagan signed an order authorizing the covert shipments by the C.I.A.” [5] “As a result, this year the Reagan Administration shipped or condoned six deliveries of arms to Iran, and three American hostages were freed. Three other Americans, however, were taken hostage this fall.” (J)

February 1986- “A senior Israeli official, Amiram Nir, came to Washington later last December [1985] with word that the Iranian middlemen had sweetened the terms. Just one more arms shipment, Mr. Nir reported, would win the release of the five American hostages in Lebanon and open ties to moderates in Teheran. President Reagan changed his mind, and the arms were sent in February. But the hostages were not released, beginning a pattern that would recur again and again.” (J)

November 27, 1986-NYT writes: “Now, the Administration's secret overture to Iran appears to have been the product, in part, of Israel's growing role in shaping Washington's assessments of the Middle East's turbulent rivalries. Increasingly, academic experts and former Government officials observe, White House aides with close personal and professional ties to Israel seem to have absorbed Israeli views on the ability of well-placed weapons sales or military action to influence the internal politics of Middle Eastern nations. The Administration's clandestine contacts and arms sales designed to bolster pro-Western moderates inside Iran, for example, had been strongly advocated by Israel from 1979 to 1982, and then again in the last two years. [1984-86]” [1]

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