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Coming out of one of those intellectual Catholic backgrounds via 4 years in one of the better secular universities in this country, I might have remained forever confused, not to mention disillusioned, if I had not learned to meditate when I was in my late 20s. I mean the deeper sort of meditation such as practiced in certain forms of Buddhism.
I wonder what would have happened of someone had taught St Thomas Aquinas to meditate. Perhaps he didn't need to, since I believe he found Plato and that served his purpose?
Anyway, the really interesting thing about meditation is that it does uncover some of those absolutes of human existence. They can be found written down in the great myths of all cultures. And they are also, essentially, wordless. Yet they're deeply religious in the sense of pointing to an intelligence behind all of this universe, and us, etc.
Whenever I get tangled in the intricacies of Western theology and philosophy, not to mention politics, I just remember the Dalai Lama and let go.
The major problem I take away from Miller's reading of Eagleton (and already we are dealing with a mediated reading of the text of another, so we are footnoting a footnote at this point) is this notion that "postmodernism" has only one ... dare I say it ... meaning. There are many strains of postmodernist thought, very of which seek to claim that meaning is so relativistic as to be applicable to only one's own viewpoint. I think the appropriate name for that kind of thinking is solipsism.
Postmodernist thought does aim (or I point to it aiming at) exposing essentialist/foundationalist ideology through language games, semiotics and playfulness. No serious postmodern thinker (a contradiction, maybe) would claim that reality has only the meaning "I" impose upon it. Of course, tigers are biological beings with drives, impulses and actions. But the meaning of tiger (not "a particular, real, growling, damned, hungry tiger at the entrance to our tent," in this case) is clearly culturally depedent. I can't change the existent behaviour of a tiger by calling it a kitten, but I might be able to modify the meaning of tiger within our particular language game by attaching unexpected extensions to it.
I mean, honestly, isn't your first thought of "tiger" either Tony the Tiger or the Detriot Tigers or "Tyger, Tyger burning bright," or your local college team. The point being postmodernists don't claim to actually change reality by re-naming a thing. As pointed out by others, Miller is representing Eagleton as creating strawmen (who appear quite hollow as the rats run through the alley) out of postmodernists.
I would offer the following positive view of postmodernist thought. Being aware that we are culture carriers, wholly and completely contingently cast into particular language games, presents an opportunity to resist the dominant power structures and "be" (as Buddha says(!)).
Well, enough for now.
Philosophy as a practical endeavor is quite useless. I say this as a former philosophy major. It did teach me to think, however, and in that sense it's been the most practical thing I've ever done.
As for Eagleton and the "straw man" of postmodernism that he attacks, it's not clear that he is actually making a straw man argument. I haven't read the book, but what he seems to be saying is that postmodernism is not a coherent viewpoint, and even postmodernists do not think about things or act in an anti-essentialist way. That is, their actions do not correspond to their ideas. He appears to believe that actions and their effects are the measure, so he's more of a philosophic pragmatist and Aristotelian than anything. That's more or less what Wittgenstein was talking about later in his life.
G.W. is sort of the opposite of the postmodernists that Eagleton is criticizing. He personally believes in some absolute ideas, but his actions are raw ends-justify-means power grabs, completely absent of any coherent principles. He's like a mutant spawn of Derrida and Louis XIV.
Pirsig ended Lila by simply asserting that "Good is a verb" and indeed the etymological root of god is just that...good.
ps.I'm loving the civility of the discourse!
-- natlearn -- Thursday, June 14, 2007 10:57 AM
Actually, at the end of Lila, Phaedrus concludes that good is a noun.
Owww! A right spanking on the Pirsig misquote, even if you did give the ending away!
plus a bit o' the Buddha ... The good old-fashioned "all we are is dust in the wind"-type comments (hey great! uh, now what?) have convinced me to buy Eagleton's book ASAP - thanks! After all, I'm Irish-Catholic, have always respected Marxist critiques (just about as much as Libertarian or Positivist critiques), love to see power/privilege unmasked as much as the next white guy, think Bush-Cheney is the ultimate false consciousness/empty signifier/bummer, and hate bourgeois liberals especially Trekkies - re Eagleton: What's not to like? Thanks again, guys!
Life is nothing but a mad man's dream. It is a dilemma which none can explain not can understand. All theories about life suffer from inadequacies and controversies. If torture is bad in one case it is the supreme goodness in other. The question is: Is a man answerable to God or the Supreme Being, who gave him life and hurled him into this world, for his life, for the acts of his existence? Were it so, don't you think God would be 'double taxing' his creation,,,,one for the Father's Sin and the other for spending his own life on earth? Life no more than a biological phenomena-Only you adopt a code of life of your choice to live it. Morals are relative conducts and vary from place to place, people to people, even of the same religion.
for a good review and for instigating an interesting discussion. I would like to see more of this kind of thing in Salon-- there are so many intelligent readers out there.
As for me, I think that "Everythinginmoderation" pinpoints the crux of the problem with postmodernism:
The power of postmodernism to disrupt, while perhaps useful to challenge oppressive ideologies that assume fixed base lines in race and gender dominance, or in religion, and which impede humanitarian progression, also implies a power to disrespect. Hence, an illusory freedom of all to construct and discard identities becomes a useful mask for business as usual.
The midcentury and multicultural philosophers tacitly embrace an ethic which they cannot in turn defend. Hence the confusion and conflict that results when, for example, feminists try to affirm the rights of Muslim women-- is the Muslim culture or the feminine culture to prevail? The preference for feminine culture (over the phallo-centric or patriarchal) in Western postmodernism is clear, but the writers can't find a way to say it without simultaneously infantilizing their Muslim sisters.
And I'd say Eagleton approaches a solution when he directs our attention to the social nature of humanity, but I'm not willing to show everything in my hand, yet, due to my professional interest in the problem.
Look for my book to come out in 6 years or so (tee hee).