Letters to the Editor
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A Note to MWR...
MWR...
You wrote that if someone "can point to something that shows we had agreed to let the Japanese keep the Emperor at the time the surrender was signed--and that they believed it--that would change my position somewhat. But I don't think that was the case."
Actually, it was the case.
Here is the wording in the Potsdam Declaration regarding Emperor Hirohito:
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
The day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the Japanese replied to the Potsdam declaration:
The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam with the understanding that said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.
Truman met with his cabinet to discuss this term and in that meeting, Secretary of State James Byrnes flatly rejected it. But in the end, what they did was retreat from the language of unconditional surrender by delicately tweaking the declaration concerning the Emperor. Here's the tweak in our reply to the Japanese:
The authority of the Emperor shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.
While not explicitly stating that we were allowing the Japanese to keep their Emperor, it was a way of retreating from Potsdam, however delicately, and it allowed the Japanese to accept the conditions of surrender.
So clearly we backed off on one of the key tenets of Potsdam. Does that mean the surrender was conditional? Depends on how you read it. But clearly we changed one of our key positions because at that point, our retreat from Potsdam couldn't be explicit. We had too much on the line, as did the Japanese. So we simply finessed it and both sides saved face.
And that finessing, in practice, turned out to be no different than what Secretary of War Henry Stimson had proposed long before we dropped the atomic bombs. And that was allowing the Japanese to keep their Emperor.
And the position of the Emperor has to be understood in the context of the times. Carroll talks about it somewhat, but an excellent picture of wartime Japan and events in the country leading up to it is given in James Bradley's Flyboys. In the book, Bradley clearly lays out the fanaticism of the Japanese and their devotion to their Emperor.
I would suggest, MWR, that you read House of War. The book changed my perceptions of what actually happened at the end of World War II. Carroll lays out that the devil is in the details. And the book is full of many details that few probably know.
As for other people here who are viciously attacking Carroll, maybe you wouldn't be doing so if you actually took the time to read the book. Carroll's work here is a sobering look at some of the defining moments in world history. And as always, that history is not exactly what we've been told.
I mean hell, Carroll even rehabilitates Reagan in some sense. Does that seem to jibe with what people feel about this book? Shouldn't a guy like Carroll be tearing Reagan down? Well he does and he doesn't. As with many other issues, he portrays the complexity that surrounds these events and turns our perceptions on their head in many different ways.
And that's the point. So before you lash out, why don't you read.
And finally, thanks to Farhad for a nice piece on a great book.