The Attorney General has directed the Justice Department's National Security Division (NSD) and Privacy and Civil Liberties Office to work with the FBI in implementing corrective actions, consider any further review and reforms that are needed, and to report to the Attorney General regularly on the process.

http://www.yubanet.com/artman/publish/article_52683.shtml

The final rule (http://cryptome.org/doj030707.htm) for the DoJ's NSD became effective on March 7. The division was created by the Patriot Act reauthorization of 2005 and its head, Kenneth Wainstein, was approved by the Senate last September, but now it's ramping up. In addition to looking into the FBI's handling of National Security Letters, it will administer the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, prosecute whistleblowers, and provide oversight of intelligence and national security matters by executive agencies. The final rule is not subject to Congressional review and the NSD can advise Congress about its activities, "if appropriate."

The DoJ seems to have things pretty well wrapped up. So, who needs Congress, anyway?

The link to the retraction letter should be:

http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/doj_specterletter_030907.pdf

The 2006 reference is the DoJ white paper: Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf

Which Glenn dealt with here (among other places): http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/01/justice-department-tries-again_20.html

...is just incredible. It represents all the thinking (& confabulation & obfuscation) of this administration in regard to the TSP, state secrets, prosecution of the press...you name it. Here's something I didn't know (apologies if this came up in the Padilla/videotape post):

Question 14. Recently, U.S. District Court Judge Marcia Cooke authorized Jose Padilla, a former enemy combatant, to review classified information, including memoranda and videotapes regarding his status and information obtained during his interrogations, for use in his defense in a separate Miami terrorism case. What prevented the Administration from invoking the State Secrets Privilege in this case?

ANSWER: The Government may not invoke the state secrets privilege in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).

So, when you can't invoke state secrets privilege, just lose it. Congress has a tough row to hoe.

The main issue regarding signing statements is the administration's claims of authority and his attempts to "unbalance" power.

Each of the problems that are the result of the administration's claims of authority - warrantless surveillance, torture, waging war, etc. - need to be dealt with individually by Congress. It's not going to be quick and easy. (I'm not a lawyer, btw.)

A CRS Report dated 9/26/06 explains the significance of signing statements. This is from the conclusion:

While the broad assertions of executive authority contained in these statements carry significant implications, both practical and constitutional, for the traditional relationship between the Executive Branch and Congress, they do not have legal force or effect, and have not been utilized to effect the formal nullification of laws. Instead, it appears that recent administrations, as made apparent by the voluminous challenges lodged by President George W. Bush, have employed these instruments in an attempt to leverage power and control away from Congress by establishing these broad assertions of authority as a constitutional norm.

It can be argued that the appropriate focus of congressional concern should center not on the issuance of signing statements themselves, but on the broad assertions of presidential authority forwarded by Presidents and the substantive actions taken to establish that authority. Accordingly, a robust oversight regime focusing on substantive executive action, as opposed to the vague and generalized assertions of authority typical of signing statements, might allow Congress in turn to more effectively assert its constitutional prerogatives and ensure compliance with its enactments. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf

Somehow I cut off part of my comment.

Kovie And, instead of decrying them, should we not be celebrating the existance and proliferation of these signing statements?

Definitely. They help show us in what ways and how far Bush is willing to push. Congress needs to take back its power and now they have plenty to push back with.

While you're waiting for an answer, part of it might be here. Many of the signing statements may not be spelled out well enough to be used in the way you suggest.

Many of the objections are written in such general and opaque terms, and with resort to vague assertions about an intent to “construe” the provisions in conformity with the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the “unitary executive,” etc., that it is impossible to know just what they mean in terms of how the Administration is implementing the statutes in question. According to Prof. Cooper, in President Bush's first term alone he offered 505 constitutional objections to various statutory provisions, and many of those objections applied to multiple provisions within a particular bill. This might mean that the Executive is refusing to implement hundreds of statutes enacted since 2001 (and many enacted prior to that date, too), or construing them in an implausible and unexpected way—or, then again, it might not. Congress and the public are offered no clear understanding of the legal theory of unconstitutionality, or of precisely which statutory provisions will not be enforced, under what circumstances, and why. The statements are, instead, mere placeholders, with respect to a vast number of statutory provisions, signaling that the Administration reserves the right not to enforce numerous unspecified provisions.

http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/specialguests/2006/jul/31/untangling_the_debate_on_signing_statements

And the comments that came after it.