And the American people would be well served if the media were asking them. But they are not, and, as our continuing participation here shows, they are not likely to. Still, and without the media's resources or access, there are some obvious answers.

My questions are:

Q: What have been the supposed various failures to "coordinate policy" that prompted the creation of this new position?

A: 1.  Afghanistan
    2.  Iraq
    3.  Iran
    4.  Syria
    5.  Lebanon
    6.  Israel
    7.  North Korea
    8.  A myriad other diplomatic/foreign policy/military gaffes that have undercut national security, including, but not limited to:

• Secret prisons in eastern Europe and elsewhere
• Gunning down a high-ranking Italian intelligence officer in Iraq at the completion of his successful mission
• Kidnapping of foreign nationals (German, Italian) off the streets for "extraordinary rendition"
• Attempting to locate missile sites in eastern Europe without considering the immediate diplomatic ramifications

Q: What kind of different "policy coordination" is envisioned by its creation?

A: Unknown. The paragraph you quoted from WaPo suggests that it is not policy "coordination" at all but simply a way to bypass the chain of command. At present, the operational chain of command goes from the president to the SecDef to the area commander (CentCom) then to the commander in the field (Petraeus). Apparently Bush wants a channel direct from himself to Petraeus unencumbered by people who have either tactical and strategic military training or scruples. Gates has shown remarkable common sense and restraint in his office (at least as compared with his predecessor) and the commander of CentCom (Adm Fallon) has already publicly stated that an attack on Iran "won't happen on my watch". The comment that LWM linked to (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2007/05/open_thread_on_.html) also suggests that Bush wants to create a situation where he can exercise direct tactical control over troops in the field. Think Hitler and Stalingrad, i.e, recipe for disaster.

Q: Why is better "policy coordination" (or whatever Lute is supposed to be doing) seen as the solution to anything at all?

When nothing that has been tried has worked it may always be useful to do something that hasn't been tried before. Think what might be possible if DOD, DOS, and OVP were all saying the same thing at the same time and the things they were saying were actually being implemented rather than merely being lip service to some abstract platitudes. It could conceivably give the impression that there is actually a plan involved.

Q: Has not being able to "cut through the bureaucracy" been the (or even a) problem? Is Petraeus not taking phone calls? Has not being able to "talk directly" with "key figures" to "figure out what is needed to make progress on the ground" occurred at all? To the extent it has, has it been a major problem? How? In what ways?

A: Not being able to cut through the bureaucracy is a fairly good working description of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Admittedly, it is much too late to fix it now. The time to fix it was April of 2003. The glorious success of the reconstruction of Iraq is an adequate answer. Think of all the infrastructure that has been renewed, the electricity generation capabilities, the increased oil production, the abundance of safe drinking water and the extensive health care and medical facilities. What? You say you haven't heard about these? Well that's because the liberal media has been systematically suppressing the good news out of Iraq. The billions of dollars authorized for reconstruction have been spent so the reconstruction must have been done, nicht wahr?

Q: The issues of competency and redundancy (while completely valid) aside, the case for such a position even on the White House's own terms has not been made.

A: When the ostensible reason for something doesn't make sense and even if the reason given did make sense, it wouldn't have much effect, one should suspect that one is being sold a bill of goods. The list of goodies looks impressive, but the packing cases are empty. Whatever the purpose of the war czar is, the reasons that we are being told that one is needed don't stand up to scrutiny. Would the Bush administration say one thing and do another? Can anyone think of an instance where this might have happened?