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Published Letters: 251
In the article, at least, Goldfarb does not argue for "near dictatorial powers" for the president in all respects, but "in pursuing foreign policy and war." In the Federalist Papers article he links to, in which Hamilton counsels against a "feeble executive", I think this is the critical passage:
There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.
I understand the argument, I don't even find it particularly outrageous. But I think Goldfarb errs when he argues that the Hamilton piece supports the idea that the founders wanted the president to have near dictatorial powers "in pursuing foreign policy and war."
Article II Section 2 of the Constitution vests the president as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces "when called into the actual service" of the country - an obvious reference to the Congress's sole power to declare war. Section 2 also vests the President with the power to enter into treaties, but with "the advice and consent of the Senate."
The way I read it, the Founders wanted the president to call the shots as to the conduct of a particular war, not to be endlessly second-guessed by Congress; for Congress to decide when and where we go to war; and for treaty power to be shared by the executive and legislature with the president taking the lead--which makes sense, so that foreign leaders would know they were dealing with a single person and not a committee.
If Goldfarb had just said there's a case to be made that Hamilton was arguing for executive "near dictatorial power" in the conduct of a particular war, I would say he had a colorable argument. But to extend the "energetic executive" argument to the "pursuit of foreign policy and war" in general is to way overstate the case.
That is the argument made explicitly by Yoo theorists since 9/11. To assert that is to do far more than "overstate the case" with regard to presidential powers. It's to advocate a view of government that is as antithetical as possible to what our government was as intended to be.
I don't disagree with you.
In my comment, I simply wanted to focus narrowly on Goldfarb's specific argument and the evidence he provided to support it, engage it and criticize it. I don't deny that it is in service of a larger, more pernicious and troubling neonconservative movement. I thought there was also value in addressing and knocking down Goldfarb's arguments strictly on its own terms. And as I said, taken on its own terms, I don't think his point is completely beyond the pale, just wrong.
But I think the main thrust of your post today is that for McCain to appoint such people to such high-level posts in his campaign is a clear indication that such people would be major players in a McCain administration, and voters need to be warned of that (since a majority are clearly not happy with Iraq), and our media is not doing a very good job of it.
This passage from The Federalist relates the debate about the composition of the executive branch. There were some who felt that executive power diffused over a body of three individuals was preferable to granting one man the power to decide, hence the mention of a plurality.
You are not mistaken, you are absolutely right. And yet I don't think it's entirely specious (not that you said so) to use Hamilton's reasoning to argue that it's a good idea for one person to have a lot of latitude in commanding our forces in a time of war.
As Glenn points out, a problem occurs when "war" is defined overbroadly. As far as I can tell, the authoritarians aren't arguing for "near-dictatorial" executive power just because it's a good idea, but because of the insidious nature of the 9/11 attacks, perpetrated by sleeper cells living among us and somewhat shielded by our fairly expansive notions of privacy and civil liberty, that this is something the founders didn't envision and that therefore our definition of "war" needs to be much more broadly construed.
I understand that point, even though I think they go too far. I was in law school during 9/11 and I argued that to prevent further attacks we might want to recalibrate our approach to civil liberties, always using "reasonableness" as our guiding light. I was told the Bushies would get it all wrong and go way overboard. I wanted to believe they wouldn't, and thought the classic convservative mistrust of "jackbooted thugs" and black helicopters would temper their judgment.
Of course, I was proved wrong. But I still believe there's a way we can protect ourselves without infringing on our civil liberties as badly as this administration has.
The Founders meant to create the President as a Dictator. Anyone who denies that is just quibbling with semnatics.
Neither jschultz or Goldfarb make that argument (although I disagree with both). Aren't we being just a bit reductive?